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JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL AND THE 
JURISPRUDENCE OF CENTRISM 
Mark Tushnet* 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. By John C. Jeffries, Jr. New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons. 1994. Pp. xii, 690. $30.00. 
J. INTRODUCTION 
John Jeffries's1 respectful biography of Justice Lewis F. Powell 
carefully describes how Powell found himself at the Supreme 
Court's center during his tenure. He was "the Supreme Court's 
center of gravity" (p. 404) and its "guiding spirit" (p. 405). Jeffries's 
work also provides an opportunity to reflect on the kind of centrism 
Powell endorsed - or, perhaps better, embodied. Powell "instinc-
tively recoiled from extreme positions" (p. 409); his centrism was so 
deeply a part of his persona that he hardly chose it in the way the 
term endorsed suggests. As Powell became more comfortable in his 
judicial role, the balance that his centrism expressed turned out to 
be a rather direct reflection of his own views about what constitutes 
sound public policy. 
His record on the Supreme Court demonstrates the limits of the 
social vision of the class he represented. Powell came from a rela-
tively well-to-do background in the solid white Virginia middle 
class. His family was neither rich nor grindingly poor, though it 
experienced some tight moments during economic downturns. 
Powell's talents and his drive to achieve, which Jeffries stresses 
throughout, propelled him to the upper echelon of corporate 
America. For example, Powell's support for abortion rights, quali-
fied by his refusal to find unconstitutional limits on public funding 
for abortions, reflects his experience with people who needed ac-
cess to abortions and could locate private resources to pay for them, 
rather than experience with equally needful people who could not 
locate the necessary private resources. Powell's jurisprudence of 
balancing may be suitable only for a Court whose members have a 
more capacious social vision than Powell. Perhaps Justices like 
Powell would do better if they adhered to a more formalist jurispru-
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. B.A. 1967, Harvard; J.D. 1971, 
M.A. 1971, Yale. - Ed. I would like to thank L. Michael Seidman for his comments on a 
draft of this review. 
1. Emerson G. Spies Professor of Law, Horace W. Goldsmith Resident Professor of Law, 
and Academic Associate Dean, University of Virginia; law clerk to Justice Powell 1973-74. 
1854 
May 1995] Justice Powell 1855 
dence, in which adherence to rules screens out some considerations 
that a "balancer" might take into account. Of course, the particular 
rules a formalist followed would matter a great deal; the hope, how-
ever, would be to develop rules that screen out invidious considera-
tions that, perhaps subconsciously, influence a balancer's decisions. 
To Jeffries, Powell was a "pragmatic conservative" (p. 470), 
whose opinions were a "mosaic of accommodation, highly differen-
tiated and strongly variegated but of a generally conservative hue" 
(p. 403). Jeffries shows, however, that Powell's views on his judicial 
role changed somewhat during his tenure. Arriving at the Court 
essentially untutored in constitutional law, Powell began with his 
instinctive conservatism, which took the form of an undifferentiated 
posture of "judicial restraint" that he invoked in nearly all contexts 
without serious consideration of the possibility that restraint might 
be appropriate in some contexts but not others. As he gained expe-
rience, Powell became more confident in the propriety of judicial 
activism - at least when its results fit within his social vision (pp. 
425, 499). As Jeffries puts it, "[t]he principle [of restraint] declined 
into an attitude" (p. 425). 
In his analysis of Powell's work on the Supreme Court, Jeffries 
primarily concentrates on abortion, race relations, and capital pun-
ishment cases.2 Because Jeffries limits his treatment of the Court's 
work so severely, his picture of Powell's centrism is slightly out of 
focus·.3 By examining some materials Jeffries omits, I hope to adjust 
the focus in a way that brings out more clearly the limits of Powell's 
jurisprudence. 
Describing a case early in Powell's tenure,4 Jeffries writes that 
Powell had "no interest in mak[ing] a deal" (p. 304) about what the 
law was or should be. Elsewhere, however, Jeffries shows Powell 
working with his colleagues to formulate a position acceptable to 
enough of them to constitute a majority or a plurality. So, for ex-
ample, in the 1976 death penalty cases,5 Powell worked with Jus-
tices John Paul Stevens and Potter Stewart to uphold death penalty 
statutes that, in their view, sufficiently limited the states' discretion 
2. There is also a chapter on the Nixon tapes case. Pp. 371-'.l7. 
3. This is not a severe criticism of Jeffries's well-written and engaging work, which is long 
enough to tax general readers. If Jeffries had included more legal detail, he might have made 
the book substantially less attractive to that audience. I do believe that a somewhat less 
austere treatment of Powell's work on the Supreme Court might have improved the book. 
This is particularly true because some other pages in the book seem to be padding. See, e.g., 
p. 27 (describing the Virginia Military Institute solely, it seems, because it was located in the 
same town as Powell's college); pp. 98-103, 109-12 (describing some aspects of military opera-
tions during World War II); pp. 353-69 (describing the consequen~ of Roe v. Wade, particu-
larly its impact on constitutional theory). 
4. Keyes v. Denver Sch. Dist No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
5. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 
(1976). 
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in the administration of the death penalty. 6 Powell seems to have 
"made deals" in such instances, but close examination of Powell's 
actions shows that Jeffries is right: Powell rarely negotiated over 
opinions, in part because his position at the Court's center meant 
that his colleagues had to move to meet him, and in part because his 
perception of himself as a centrist led him to believe that the law 
must be what he thought it was. I use two cases, one quite obscure 
and one of renewed importance today, to illuminate Powell's juris-
prudence of centrism. 
II. MURGIA AND REsHAPING POWELL'S ROLE 
In Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,1 the Court re-
jected an equal protection challenge to a Massachusetts statute re-
quiring all state police officers to retire at the age of fifty. Although 
the published majority opinion occupies only ten pages in the 
United States Reports, it resulted from an extended controversy 
within the Court that, in my view, affected Powell's understanding 
of his place on the Court's political and jurisprudential spectrum. 
The majority agreed that the statute at issue in the case should 
be subject only to minimum scrutiny or rationality review.8 Chief 
Justice Warren Burger assigned the opinion to Justice William J. 
Brennan, probably believing that Brennan could do nothing in the 
opinion to advance the liberal cause. Brennan circulated a draft of 
the opinion in January of 1976 that immediately set Justice William 
Rehnquist on edge. Brennan used the occasion to reinterpret the 
Court's recent rationality review cases. Gerald Gunther had 
pointed out that the rationality review test the Court seemed to ap-
ply in its previous cases actually had some "bite" because several of 
the statutes invalidated in those cases could readily be justified by 
some imaginable state purposes.9 Brennan's reformulation of ra-
tionality review attempted to incorporate those cases in a new, 
more flexible standard. 
Rehnquist tried a preemptive strike. Explaining that he would 
not write a separate opinion for "a couple of weeks," Rehnquist 
6. Pp. 425-26; see also Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Chief Justice Warren 
Burger (Dec. 17, 1981), in Wtlliam J. Brennan Papers, Library of Congress [hereinafter Bren-
nan Papers], box 581, file 7 (discussing deliberations on Nixon v. Fitzgerald) ("[I]t is evident 
that a Court opinion is not assured if each of us remains with our first preference votes .... I 
am now prepared to defer to the wishes of you, Bill Rehnquist and Sandra and prepare a 
draft opinion •.•. "). Although it appears as if Powell were negotiating a compromise, he was 
merely reverting to one of the two "versions" of the Court's opinion that he had prepared 
when counsel had first argued the case. 
7. 427 U.S. 307 (1976). 
8. Murgia, 421 U.S. at 312-13. 
9. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term- Foreword: In Search of Evolving 
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 
18-20 (1972). 
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sent Brennan a letter "for [his] benefit (?)" expressing concern 
about the way in which Brennan stated the standard of rationality 
review, which would, in Rehnquist's view, "give the courts more 
leeway in striking down state legislation."10 Although Brennan 
drew his standard - "reasonable, not arbitrary, and ... [resting] 
upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial rela-
tion to the object of the legislation"11 - from prior cases, Rehn-
quist thought that Brennan had transformed its meaning, 
particularly by restating the test to require a relationship between 
the law at issue and "the state's announced objective."12 For Rehn-
quist, the standard "ought to be simply stated and ought to virtually 
foreclose judicial invalidation except in the rare, rare case where 
the legislature has all but run amok and acted in a patently arbitrary 
manner."13 
In his February 9 reply, Brennan agreed that his draft did in-
deed offer "a more :flexible rule" of the "minimum scrutiny" stan-
dard than Rehnquist supported, but he argued that the Court's 
cases had "evolved" to the point his draft described.14 Brennan 
pointed out that he could not explain several recent cases by relying 
on as loose a standard as the one Rehnquist suggested. The fair-
and-substantial-relation standard, Brennan wrote, came from an-
other half-dozen cases, which, although "fall[ing] into the twilight 
zone of equal protection," were "part of the warp and woof of 
equal protection law."15 Furthermore, though he thought that he 
and Rehnquist might disagree on whether courts should judge a 
statute only in relation to the purposes the state articulated, Bren-
nan considered it unnecessary to determine in Murgia whether the 
Court should come up with purposes if the state had not; here, he 
said, the state had articulated a purpose sufficient to justify the 
statute.16 
Brennan circulated his correspondence to the other Justices on 
February 12 with a cover letter stating that Rehnquist's position 
was "at odds with statemen~ in a number of equal protection cases 
10. Letter from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice William J. Brennan 1 (Jan. 30, 
1976), in Thurgood Marshall Papers, Library of Congress [hereinafter Marshall Papers], box 
165, file 8. The file on Murgia is not included in Justice Brennan's papers at the Library of 
Congress. 
11. Id. at 2. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 3. 
14. Letter from Justice William J. Brennan to Justice William H. Rehnquist 1 (Feb. 9, 
1976), in Marshall Papers, supra note 10. 
15. Id. at 2. 
16. Id. at 3. 
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... over the past half century."17 Perhaps because the correspon-
dence clarified Brennan and Rehnquist's disagreement about the 
appropriate amount of flexibility in the minimum rationality stan-
dard, the case made "little progress" toward disposition for a 
month.18 
Meanwhile, a side issue - the political participation of the af-
fected group - had come to distract some Justices. In explaining 
why the mandatory retirement statute did not have to satisfy any 
strict standard of review, Brennan referred to "the political clout of 
the aged."19 Justice Harry Blackmun thought that lack of "political 
clout" might justify more stringent review, but he was "hesitant to 
go beyond that. "20 Though Justice Powell agreed with "much" of 
Brennan's reasoning, he too rejected what he called Brennan's 
"central position that a high degree of political participation in itself 
is sufficient to support the conclusion that those of middle age do 
not form a suspect class. "21 
By the beginning of April it seemed that Brennan's opinion 
might not get a single additional vote. Powell circulated an opinion 
attempting to :flesh out in some detail an analysis of political power 
adequate to the case. In the first section of the opinion, Powell 
claimed that neither "high numerical representation" nor "the 
existence of a body of remedial legislation" was enough to "remove 
a group that displays the other indicia" from the "suspect" cate-
gory.22 He argued that relying on remedial legislation, for example, 
"could penalize those who properly seek legislative rather than ju-
dicial solutions to problems of discrimination."23 Nonetheless, 
Powell offered other reasons why the Court should not apply 
heightened scrutiny in this case; because the statute forced retire-
ment at age fifty, it encompassed more than "the elderly."24 Fur-
thermore, "persons of mature age," Powell wrote, "have not 
suffered any deprivation of political power," and "may have a 
unique influence" on legislation due to seniority systems.25 
17. Memorandum from Justice William J. Brennan to Conference (Feb.12, 1976), in Mar-
shall Papers, supra note 10. Justice Potter Stewart had circulated a concurring opinion taking 
issue with Brennan's draft, to which Brennan's cover letter also refers. 
18. Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice Wtlliam J. Brennan (Mar. 11, 1976), 
in Marshall Papers, supra note 10. Justice Thurgood Marshall, normally Brennan's ally, was 
in dissent, believing the statute to be unconstitutional. 
19. Letter from Justice Brennan to Justice Rehnquist, supra note 14, at 1. 
20. Letter from Justice Blackmun to Justice Brennan, supra note 18. 
21. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Draft Opinion (Mass. Bd. of Retirement et al. v. Murgia) 
(Apr. 7, 1976), in Marshall Papers, supra note 10, at 2. 
22. Id. at 3. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 4. 
25. Id. 
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The second section of Powell's draft, citing Gunther's article, ba-
sically agrees with Brennan's proposition that the Court's applica-
tion of "minimum rationality" review had become more flexible. 
Powell discussed the ways in which courts might identify "legiti-
mate" state purposes and cautioned against "imagin[ing] policy 
where none has been indicated by the legislature."26 Brennan con-
ferred with Powell and adopted Powell's opinion.27 Even then, "no 
Court developed,"28 and Brennan turned the opinion over to Pow-
ell. Powell revised his draft "to attain as much unanimity as possi-
ble on a general formulation of the rational basis equal protection 
test."29 
Rehnquist continued to find the Powell-Brennan position unsat-
isfactory. Powell's test, he wrote, "is really a very significant depar-
ture from constitutional adjudication as developed in the decisions 
of this Court."30 In a letter conveying in firm tones the depth of his 
disagreement with the Powell-Brennan position, Rehnquist stated 
that an extensive discussion of whether the statute affected a sus-
pect classification was unnecessary, and he particularly objected to 
Powell's treatment of "the relative success of the aged in obtaining 
their wishes legislatively."31 Rehnquist understood, however, that 
this discussion of political participation was not central to the out-
come, and he focused more on what he called the "expansion" of 
the rational basis test.32 
Rehnquist had two main concerns. Although he agreed that 
state statutes had to pursue "legitimate" purposes, he was uncon-
vinced that the Court needed to elaborate on that requirement.33 
In particular, he thought that Powell's discussion of hypothesized 
state purposes was confusing. Here Rehnquist's tone became espe-
cially critical; he claimed that one implication of a phrase in a foot-
note was "difficult to support in law or logic"34 and he complained 
that the basis for another suggestion "escapes me entirely."35 Fur-
thermore, Rehnquist had "the most serious reservations about that 
portion of [Powell's] memorandum which seems to contemplate the 
bodily assumption into the Equal Protection Clause of Professor 
26. Id. at 7. 
27. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Conference (May 19, 1976), in 
Marshall Papers, supra note 10. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Letter from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 9 (May 25, 
1976), in Marshall Papers, supra note 10. 
31. Id. at 3. 
32. Id. at 3-4. 
33. Id. at 5-6. 
34. Id. at 8. 
35. Id. 
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Gunther's article."36 That article, Rehnquist wrote, "seems to me 
to be in the area of political science, rather than of constitutional 
law."37 Here too Rehnquist focused on how to treat legislative pur-
poses. Rehnquist concluded with a "peroration" because he had 
"gotten [him]self sufficiently worked up."38 According to Rehn-
quist, the "basic shortcoming" of Powell's analysis was that 
it sets up this Court ... to evaluate a legislative decision to implement 
a particular purpose by enacting some provision of a given statute. It 
seems to me almost inconceivable that we could correctly conclude 
that a group of legislators, all devoting a good part of their time to the 
art of legislation, chose a means which was not "genuinely" related to 
their purpose.39 
Needing votes from Justices who had not yet responded, Powell 
removed most of the discussion of legislative purpo_se from the 
draft,40 though he had earlier said that he did not believe the Jus-
tices were "far apart in substance."41 Even this did not comfort 
Rehnquist. But Rehnquist agreed "to do some accommodating of 
[his] own" and to "swallow [his] objections ... if the resolution of 
this battle is by agreement to be left for another day."42 He was 
willing to let Powell's discussion of purpose stand only if the opin-
ion also presented "both sides of the doctrinal dispute" by including 
a quotation of Rehnquist's preferred standard.43 "Admittedly," 
Rehnquist wrote, "this is inconsistent with your analysis, but it will 
not be the first time that an Equal Protection opinion has contained 
verbal inconsistencies. "44 
By this point it was clear that the Court was hopelessly divided 
on equal protection theory, or at least on the verbal formulations 
that conscientious Justices used to describe standards of review. 
Powell apparently was uncomfortable with writing an opinion that, 
in both his and Rehnquist's eyes, was internally inconsistent, and he 
circulated a final draft that was "about as blandly written as one can 
write. "45 The draft, he told his colleagues, left each of them "free to 
36. Id. at 10. 
37. Id. at 10-11. 
38. Id. at 17. 
39. Id. at 18. 
40. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Conference (June 7, 1996), in Mar-
shall Papers, supra note 10. 
41. Memorandum from Justice Powell to Conference (May 19, 1976), supra note 27. 
42. Letter from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1-2 (June 9, 
1976), in Marshall Papers, supra note 10. 
43. Id. at 2. 
44. Id. 
45. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Conference (June 15, 1976), in 
Marshall Papers, supra note 10. 
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'fight again another day.' "46 This final draft became the Court's 
opinion. 
Although the published opinion in Murgia reflects nothing of 
Powell's struggle with the case, the Court's contentious delibera-
tions helped shape Powell's jurisprudence. When he circulated his 
final draft, Powell told his colleagues that "my zeal for writing has 
been so thoroughly dampened by this spring's experience, that it 
may be sometime before I venture forth again."47 For the next few 
years he regularly referred to the "struggle" in Murgia. 48 
Jeffries notes that Powell came to the Court knowing little about 
constitutional law (p. 334). He did, however, see himself as a rea-
sonable person. In Murgia that reasonableness translated almost 
directly into constitutional doctrine. As Powell understood what 
had happened, Rehnquist stood on his right, refusing to adopt what 
Powell believed to be an entirely reasonable position and fighting 
for a purely theoretical point, while Brennan stood on his left, being 
as reasonable as one could ask. Because Powell equated centrism 
with reasonableness, he came to see Brennan as closer to him in 
judicial philosophy than his more conservative colleagues. Bren-
nan's liberalism, in short, seemed to Powell more reasonable than 
Rehnquist's conservatism. The Murgia experience showed Powell 
that it might be relatively easy for an individual Justice like himself 
to maintain a centrist jurisprudence, but that it was another for the 
Court as an institution to do so - reasonableness could not always 
be equated with centrism for the Court as a whole. Moreover, the 
experience in Murgia contributed to what Jeffries describes as Pow-
ell's increasing willingness to set aside legislative judgments (p. 425) 
even though in that case Powell, Brennan, and Rehnquist all agreed 
that the Massachusetts statute was constitutional. Because Powell 
believed he was so reasonable, he believed that whatever judgments 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. See, e.g., Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice William H. Rehnquist 
(United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz) (Nov. 10, 1980), in Brennan Papers, box 555, file 
2 (mentioning "getting caught in a 'cross-fire' " in Murgia); Letter from Justice Lewis F. Pow-
ell, Jr. to Justice William J. Brennan (United States v. Crews) (Dec. 14, 1979), in Brennan 
Papers, box 523, file 6 ("This case reminds me a little bit of Murgia."); Letter from Justice 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice John Paul Stevens (McAdams v. McSurely) (Apr. 12, 1978), in 
Brennan Papers, box 474, file 7 ("I have already spent as much time on this 'loser' as Bill 
Brennan and I did a couple of years ago in Murgia."); Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
to Justice William J. Brennan (Craig v. Boren) (Dec. 6, 1976), in Brennan Papers, box 439, 
file 5 ("Although I have some reservations as to the breadth of your discussion of the appli-
cable standard for equal protection analysis (Murgia revisited!), I am in substantial agree-
ment with you."). Although Powell revised his draft opinion in Murgia, I think his actions 
are not well described as dealmaking. His discomfort with the process, reflected in his later 
comments, suggests that Powell reluctantly acquiesced in a course his colleagues forced on 
him. 
1862 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 93:1854 
he reached on constitutional matters were by definition reasonable 
ones. 
ill. PLYLER v. .Doe AND "ACCOMMODATING" POWELL 
Plyler v. Doe49 involved the constitutionality of a Texas statute 
denying a free public education to children of aliens who were pres-
ent in the United States unlawfully. Several issues occupied the 
Court's attention. The Fourteenth Amendment's first sentence and 
its Privileges and Immunities Clause both refer to "citizens," 
though the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses refer to 
"persons."50 Were illegal aliens covered by the Amendment? Sec-
ond, if the Amendment did cover illegal aliens, were illegal aliens 
or their children a "suspect class" so that the government could 
deny benefits to them 'only if the reasons for the denial were excep-
tionally strong?_ Third, even if Texas's statute did not have to satisfy 
the strict scrutiny given to laws adversely affecting suspect classes, 
was it a rational response to the problems Texas faced?51 Justices 
Brennan and Powell played crucial roles in resolving these 
questions. 
Justice Brennan's typed notes for his conference presentation 
start with his conclusion that the Texas statute was unconstitu-
tional.52 He thought that strict scrutiny "could be applied" because 
the statute ~'makes a suspect classification based on alienage."53 
"Alternatively," Brennan claimed, "we might follow the line we 
have taken in the illegitimate children cases," in which the Court 
did not invoke strict scrutiny but invalidated statutes "if they are 
not substantially related to permissible state interests. "54 He be-
lieved that "the state interests are insufficient to sustain" the Texas 
statute.55 "The state interest in controlling illegal immigration" 
Brennan continued, "is simply not a permissible state interest -
that is a federal matter."56 He further stated that the evidence did 
not show that the state's interest in saving money was substantially 
related to the classification: "The state acknowledges that illegal 
49. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
50. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
51. Rattling around in the case was a question the Justices described as "preemption": 
Was the problem of illegal immigration so inherently a national matter that the federal gov-
ernment could prevent individual states from interfering with national policy even by adopt-
ing rules like Texas's that appeared to discourage illegal immigration? TEX. Eouc. CooE 
ANN. § 21.031 (Vernon Supp. 1981). 
52. Justice Wtlliam J. Brennan, 'fyped Notes for Conference Discussion 1, in Brennan 
Papers, box 590, file 2. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
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immigrants help to contribute financially to the school by property 
taxes and sales taxes," and there was no evidence that "children of 
illegal immigrants are more expensive to educate."57 
Although Justice Powell leaned toward striking the statute 
down, he found the case "hard."58 Powell focused on the fact that 
the "classification is children," and, he said, "they have no responsi-
bility for being there."59 Indeed, Powell emphasized that it is "hard 
to think of a category more helpless."6° Although he, did not think 
that education was a "fundamental right," Powell did believe that 
"if some children get it," the state cannot "<;leny it to a narrowly 
drawn classification applicable to a real resident," as were the chil-
dren in this case. 61 . 
As Brennan put it later, the conference discussion produced "no 
clear consensus" about the appropriate level of scrutiny.62 He set 
to work on an opinion that would gain the necessary five votes. In 
late January he took what he called "the unusual step of circulat-
ing" a draft opinion only to the Justices - Marshall, Blackmun, 
Powell, and Stevens - who had said they would strike the Texas 
statute down, rather than to the full Court.63 The draft, he said, was 
driven by his "particular concern with a statute, such as this, that 
sought to deprive innocent children not remotely responsible for 
their plight of their right to an education."64 
As Brennan noted, the draft "retie[ d] both on ·the nature of the 
classification, and on the importance of education."65 The confer-
ence discussion had not focused on whether education was a funda-
mental right, and Powell, whose vote Brennan needed, said it was 
not. Brennan therefore explained that, though "a strong case for 
heightened scrutiny could be made simply on the basis of the class 
discriminated against," the opinion would be "less broad" if it in-
voked the importance of education as well.6° Limiting the decision 
in this way, Brennan explained, would still leave the states "fairly 
broad prerogatives in legislating with respect to illegal aliens in 
51. Id. at 1-2. Despite Brennan's mention of the federal interest in controlling illegal 
immigration, he was not enthusiastic about relying on a straight preemption theory, which, he 
thought, would have to deny states authority more broadly than the precedents indicated. Id. 
at 2. 
58. Justice Wtlliam J. Brennan, Notes on Conference Discussion, in Brennan Papers, 
supra note 52. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Letter from Justice William J. Brennan to Justice Thurgood Marshall 1 (Jan. 25, 1982}, 
in Brennan Papers, supra note 52. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
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other contexts."67 This approach, which rooted the right to educa-
tion in the particular history of the Fourteenth Amendment, was 
"for that very reason largely self-limiting and unlikely to force us 
down any uncharted paths in the future."68 He concluded that the 
Texas statute "would fail under even an intermediate standard of 
review,"69 and he suggested how he could rewrite his draft on that 
theory. But, he warned, "exclusive reliance on the 'innocent chil-
dren' rationale, [sic] would truncate our real concern here - that 
whatever else the state may do with respect to illegal aliens, barring 
the innocent children among them from basic education is most 
perverse. "70 
Brennan's cover letter and draft opinion clearly indicate that 
Powell was his primary target.71 The introduction to the opinion 
provides a general review of the different standards for equal pro-
tection review, concluding that "in this context an understanding of 
both the nature of the classification, and the right denied, are inte-
gral" to determining the standard of review.12 
The first main part of Brennan's draft argues that the statute 
involved a suspect classification.73 It begins with a general over-
view: "Certain classifications are empirically more likely than 
others to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than legislative ra-
tionality," Brennan wrote.74 "The experience of our Nation has 
taught us that a conscious or unconscious, but in any event constitu-
tionally unacceptable, prejudice is likely to manifest itself in the leg-
islature's treatment of some groups."75 Brennan then pointed out 
that "illegal aliens display many of the characteristics of those 'dis-
crete and insular minorities' for which the Constitution offers a spe-
cial solicitude."76 For example, "[!]awfully resident aliens may have 
some access to political forums," while "illegal aliens are under-
standably reluctant to risk exposure by bringing their complaints to 
the attention of public agencies .... "77 Because of "lax enforce-
ment" of the immigration laws, Brennan explained, there was a 
"very real specter of a permanent caste of persons, welcomed as a 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 1-2. 
71. Id.; Justice William J. Brennan, Draft Opinion (Plyler v. Doe) (Jan. 25, 1982}, in 
Brennan Papers, supra note 52. 
72. Justice Brennan, Draft Opinion, supra note 71, at 17. 
73. Id. at 18-23. 
74. Id. at 18. 
75. Id. at 19. On unconscious prejudice, see Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, 
and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 {1987). 
76. Justice Brennan, Draft Opinion, supra note 71, at 19. 
77. Id. 
May 1995] Justice Powell 1865 
source of cheap labor, but nevertheless unable to participate in the 
benefits that our society makes available to citizens and lawful 
residents. "78 
After describing why the class illegal aliens might warrant strict 
scrutiny, Brennan turned to the issue of scrutiny of laws affecting 
their children - "special members of that class:"79 Perhaps state 
legislatures had "unusual prerogatives" in connection with "persons 
whose presence within the boundaries of the United States has 
been the product of their wrongful conduct."80 But, Brennan ar-
gued, that could not be true about imposing "particular disabilities 
on the children of such unlawful entrants."81 The parents, who 
"elect[ ed] to enter our territory by stealth and in violation of law[,] 
might be asked to bear the burden of legislation designed to deter 
their unlawful entry," but their children were "hardly similarly situ-
ated."82 Legislation "directing the onus of parent's [sic] misconduct 
on his children does not comport well with our most fundamental 
conceptions of justice. "83 
This first part of Brennan's opinion concludes by agreeing that 
"undocumented status" was not irrelevant to all permissible pur-
poses, and therefore that it would be inappropriate to give height-
ened scrutiny whenever statutes adversely affected illegal aliens.84 
"Nevertheless," Brennan continued, "immigration status is a char-
acteristic over which the undocumented children ... have little or 
no control." Brennan concluded that the class undocumented chil-
dren shared "many of the more significant factors" that led the 
Court to apply heightened scrutiny in other cases.85 
The second part of Brennan's opinion examines whether "the 
absolute denial of basic education" was "an interference" with a 
fundamental right.86 Brennan conceded that the Constitution does 
not explicitly guarantee the right to an education. But, quoting 
Meyer v. Nebraska, he pointed out that "the American people have 
always regarded education and the acquisition of knowledge as 
matters of supreme importance."87 Children deprived of education 
suffer, but "our Nation suffers too when select groups are denied 
the opportunity to contribute to the community of ideas within 
78. Id. at 20. 
79. Id. at 21. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 22. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 23. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 23-24. 
87. Id. at 24-25 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923)). 
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which freedom and democracy thrive."88 For Brennan, "public 
schools provide the primary vehicle by which individual initiative 
and merit are allowed to overcome the circumstances of birth."89 
Justice Brennan then offered a rather extensive survey of "[t]he 
debates and actions of the Reconstruction Congress" to show that it 
acknowledged "the importance of basic education as a means of 
advancing the material and spiritual well-being of the individual" 
and "the Nation's need for education in fulfilling its commitment to 
equality."90 He compiled statements from the Reconstruction Con-
gress indicating a special concern that the South had denied 
African-Americans access to education, and recognizing that "edu-
cation is essential to the national welfare."91 Education, to some 
members of Congress, was "necessary to a republican form of gov-
emment. "92 Although the generation that adopted the Fourteenth 
Amendment might have "hesitated before imposing upon the 
States the federal duty, and fiscal burden, of establishing a state-
wide system of free public education," they did believe that "equal 
access to basic education" was "an essential aspect of the frame-
work of equality embodied in" the Fourteenth Am.endment.93 
Taking the two parts of his analysis together, Brennan con-
cluded that heightened scrutiny was appropriate: "The Framers 
recognized that by denying certain disfavc;>red groups access to basic 
education, we deny to the members of those groups the ability to 
advance their material well-being, to contribute productively to so-
ciety, and the means to protect themselves within the structure of 
our social and civic institutions."94 Brennan stated that Powell's 
opinion for the Court in San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez, 95 which rejected an equal protection challenge to 
Texas's system of school financing, was "far on the other end of the 
equal protection spectrum."96 Denying basic education to "a dis-
crete and historically demeaned group, solely on the basis of per-
sonal status ... parallels in significant respects the type of 'class or 
caste' legislation with which the Equal Protection Clause is most 
directly concerned. "97 The statute therefore had to "advance[ ] 
some vital state need."98 The remainder of the opinion examines 
88. Id. at 25. 
89. Id. at 26. 
90. Id. at 27. 
91. Id. at 29 n.23 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 70 (1867)). 
92. Id. at 31. 
93. Id. at 33-34. 
94. Id. at 34-35. 
95. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
96. Justice Brennan, Draft Opinion, supra note 71, at 35-36. 
91. Id. at 36. 
98. Id. 
May 1995] Justice Powell 1867 
the purported state interests and finds them inadequate to support 
the statute.99 
Powell replied to the draft on January 30.10° "I view this case," 
he wrote, "in rather simplistic terms."101 Because some undocu-
mented aliens were bound to remain in the United States, "[t]heir 
children should not be left on the streets uneducated."102 He 
agreed that heightened scrutiny was appropriate because the case 
involved a class of "innocent children, uniquely postured/' but he 
did want to emphasize that the classification was "a unique one."103 
He therefore disagreed with Brennan's discussion of suspect classi-
fications. As written, Powell observed~ Brennan's draft "come[ s] 
very close to saying that all illegal aliens" are a discrete and insular 
mmon. . "ty 104 ' 
Tu.ming to the issue of the right to an education, Powell began 
by noting his nineteen years of service on public-school boards in 
Virginia, which led him to "share [Brenn~'s] view as to the impor-
tance of education, particularly in a democracy."10s But, as he had 
written in Rodriguez, he did not think there was a constitutional 
right to an education, and so would not call education "a 'funda-
mental' right in the constitutional sense. "106 He suggested empha-
sizing that "the state's own interest in not creating a subclass of 
illiterate persons many of whom will remain in Texas" weighed 
against Texas's statute.101 · 
Powell ended his letter by calling Brennan's draft "an impres-
sive piece of work" that he had "enjoyed reading."1os He stated, 
however, that he was "a little uneasy" about the broad sweep of the 
draft, which might lead to "inferences ... in other connections not 
clearly fore_seeable."109 He said that he would join the judgment, 
and he offered to join the opinion as well if Brennan reworked it to 
"focus[] ... specifically on this t,nrlquely discrete class."110 
99. Id. at 36-41. 
100. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice William J. Brennan (Jan. 30, 1982), 
in Brennan Papers, supra note 52. 
101. Id. at 1. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 2. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. Among the "[r]elatively [m]inor [p]oints" Powell made was a concern that Bren-
nan's statements about unconscious prejudice might not easily be "square[d] with" the 
Court's insistence that only intentional discrimination violated the Constitution. Id. at 3. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
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A few days later Brennan responded to Powen.111 Displaying 
his usual style, Brennan said that it seemed clear to him that "it will 
not be difficult to find common ground," and he perceived "the 
most appropriate opinion for the Court[] in very nearly the terms" 
Powell suggested.112 Diplomatically, Brennan suggested that his 
own draft did not really "wander very far afield."113 He pointed out 
several places in his draft stating expressly that there were good 
reasons not to hold illegal aliens to be a suspect classification. 
Passages that Powell read as analogizing illegal aliens to other sus-
pect classifications should be read, Brennan wrote, to "highlight the 
unique nature of the subclass of 'undocumented children.' "114 
Moreover, Brennan suggested, the draft's emphasis on the interac-
tion between the classification and the right actually narrowed the 
opinion's breadth. He did think, however, "that the discrete nature 
of the class heightens for them the significance of education."115 
Brennan attached a redrafted discussion of suspect classifica-
tions.116 The new version omitted the sentence about unconscious 
prejudice and moved to a long footnote the point about the reluc-
tance of illegal aliens to bring their complaints to public authorities. 
He thus downplayed the general treatment of illegal aliens, but it 
remained in the opinion. Brennan did ask Powell to "suggest a way 
to abbreviate the discussion of this aspect of the children's unique 
circumstance still more."117 
Brennan's letter also addresses Powell's concerns about the 
draft's discussion of the right to education. He emphasized that his 
draft stated, and the evidence included in it showed, that "there is 
just no support in [the congressional] debates ... for the idea that a 
state has any affirmative obligation to establish a system of public 
education. "118 Here too he invited Powell to "suggest any wording 
that you think might better state these conclusions if you feel that 
the slightly obscure statements presently in the text are unsatisfac-
tory. "119 But, Brennan continued, he did want to "preserve" the 
conclusion that "the history . . . confirms our shared view that we 
111. Letter from Justice William J. Brennan to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (Feb. 2, 1982), 
in Marshall Papers, supra note 52. 
112. Id. at 1. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 2. 
116. Justice Wiiliam J. Brennan, Proposed Revisions to Draft Opinion (Plyler v. Doe) 
(Feb. 2, 1982), attached to Letter from Justice Brennan to Justice Powell, supra note 111. 
117. Letter from Justice Brennan to Justice Powell, supra note 111, at 2. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 3. 
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are to look closely on the absolute denial of education to certain 
discrete groups of children."120 
Brennan's strategy seems clear enough. As he said, his first 
draft did incorporate pretty much all that Powell expressly wanted. 
As Powell understood, though, the draft contained phrases and gen-
eral discussions that Justices and lawyers could detach from the 
case's "unique" setting and use in later opinions. and briefs. Bren-
nan tried his best to preserve the statements that might have had 
broader implications by pointing out that the draft indeed dealt 
with Powell's express concerns. But, on the whole, neither the let-
ter nor the revised part of the draft was a large concession to Pow-
ell's concerns. Perhaps Brennan was testing the depth of Powell's 
commitment to his own views. 
After receiving Brennan's letter and the redrafted discussion of 
suspect classifications, Powell responded by saying that he thought 
the revision was "a substantial clarification," but that he had de-
cided to write separately.121 Powell explained: "My concern as to 
the 'open endedness' of equal protection prompts me to be ex-
tremely cautious in this case as to the reach of the precedent we 
set."122 Because the case was "quite unique," Powell "thought it 
prudent to write less exhaustively than [Brennan's] opinion."123 He 
acknowledged that Brennan too had tried "to circumscribe [the 
Court's] holding narrowly," but in the end Powell wanted to "focus 
solely on the unique status of these children."124 
Brennan then shortened his draft and circulated it to the entire 
Court.125 Although Brennan told Powell that he believed that the 
revisions "effectively preserve, and support," Powell's position in 
Rodriguez, 126 actually none of the changes affected the matters that 
concerned Powell. 
Powell circulated his own separate opinion the following day.127 
Like the opinion Powell eventually published,128 his draft stresses 
that the case involved "a form of discrimination against children for 
the acts of their parents," and he relied more explicitly than Bren-
120. Id. 
121. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice William J. Brennan (Feb. 4, 1982), 
in Brennan Papers, supra note 52. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Justice William J; Brennan, Draft Opinion (Plyler v. Doe) (Feb. 8, 1982), in Brennan 
Papers, supra note 52. 
126. Letter from Justice William J. Brennan to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (Feb. 8, 1982), 
in Brennan Papers, supra note 52. 
127. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Draft Opinion (Plyler v. Doe) (Feb. 9, 1982), in Brennan 
Papers, supra note 52. 
128. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 238 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring). 
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nan had on the Court's decisions invalidating some statutes discrim-
inating against the children of unmarried parents.129 Most notably, 
he included a long footnote disagreeing with the application of 
"strict scrutiny" and with the suggestion he drew from Brennan's 
draft that illegal aliens formed a suspect classification.130 Powell 
''wholly reject[ ed]" Brennan's "intimation" that "adult illegal aliens 
guilty of violating our laws may be entitled to 'heightened judicial 
solicitude.' "131 Furthermore, he expressly disagreed with the sug-
gestion that education was a fundamental right.132 
There matters rested, at least in writing, for about a month until 
the other Justices formulated their views. In early March Justice 
Blackmun started the discussion up again, reminding Brennan that 
in the early discussions Blackmun had been the only Justice inter-
ested in pursuing a preemption analysis because "any equal protec-
tion route seems to ·encounter analytical difficulties. "133 In the 
hope of getting a majority opinion by inducing Powell to join, 
Blackmun suggested "address[ing] the case squarely in traditional 
equal protection fundamental rights terms."134 
Blackmun's suggestions tried to address Powell's expressed con-
cerns by eliminating the suspect classification analysis entirely and 
bolstering the fundamental rights analysis.135 Unfortunately for 
Blackmun and Brennan, Powell had merely focused on the suspect 
129. Powell, Draft Opinion, supra note 127, at 1. 
130. Id. at 3 n2. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. at 4 n.2. 
133. Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice William J. Brennan 1 (Mar. 10, 
1982), in Brennan Papers, supra note 52. 
134. Id. 
135. Blackmun thought that "some modicum of education" would be "fundamental" be-
cause it "is necessary to preserve rights of expression and participation in the political pro-
cess, and therefore to preserve individual rights generally." Id. He suggested a preemption-
like response to the objection that "illegal aliens have no individual rights to preserve": some 
of the children in the case were going to be permanent residents, and some were "not pres-
ently deportable." Id. at 1-2. As a result, "[m]any of these children .•• have, or will have, 
political and related rights." Id. at 2. Furthermore, the state had no way to identify which 
children would be in that group, and therefore could not "deprive the entire group of the 
right to attend school." Id. If the Court followed this analysis, Blackmun wrote, "one could 
delete the reference to illegal aliens as a suspect class and, also, the analogy of illegal alien 
children to illegitimates." Id. 
Not surprisingly, Justice Marshall added his voice in support of "almost all" of Black-
mun's suggestions: Marshall had always wanted to emphasize the importance of the connec-
tion between education and political rights, from his argument before the Court in Brown v. 
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), to his dissent in Rodriguez. Letter from Justice 
Thurgood Marshall to Justice William J. Brennan (Mar. 10, 1982), in Brennan Papers, supra 
note 52. 
Justice Stevens, stating that "there are several different lines of legal analysis that require 
the result that you reach," said that he would accept either a fundamental rights analysis or a 
suspect classification analysis, whichever Brennan found necessary to get a majority opinion. 
Letter from Justice John Paul Stevens to Justice William J. Brennan (Mar. 10, 1982), in Bren-
nan Papers, supra note 52. 
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classification analysis without meaning to suggest that he could go 
along with treating education as a fundamental right. Brennan's 
second draft de-emphasized the former but retained the latter. Not 
having heard from Powell about the fundamental rights analysis, 
Blackmun perhaps believed that Powell did not have misgivings 
about it. Powell, however, soon disabused his colleagues of that 
idea. 'I\vo days after Blackmun sent his letter to Brennan, Powell 
wrote that it had "prompted [him] to reexamine [his] position."136 
He indicated that "[a]s important as education has been in the life 
of my family for three generations, I would hesitate before creating 
another heretofore unidentified right. "137 He "inclined" to Ste-
vens's position that thy Texas statute was simply irrational, "penal-
izing these children" in pursuit of an "insubstantial" state 
interest138 - saving money now without attention to the costs the 
state would have to bear later if the children grew up without an 
education. Here he thought that the analogy to illegitimate chil-
dren was appropriate. 
Powell concluded his letter with the thought that a majority 
opinion might not be so important in this case: "The very fact that 
we have not identified any prior case, or even any established prin-
ciple, that controls this unique case suggests that the precedential 
force of a judgment alone will not be great."139 Without a majority 
opinion, he added, the Court would be "free to meet unforeseeable 
situations without being bound by a decision tailored to redress a 
peculiar and unprecedented type of injustice."140 
Powell's argument was not enough, howeyer, to stop Brennan. 
A month later Brennan sent Powell, but not his colleagues, a third 
version of the opinion.141 Structurally the first draft had two main 
parts: (i) a general discussion of why undocumented aliens might be 
a suspect classification followed by an application of general princi-
ples to the special case of children of undocumented aliens, and (ii) 
a general discussion of why education might be a fundamental right 
followed by an application to the special case of denying education 
to a group like those children. The second draft eliminates both the 
general discussion of suspect classifications and the general discus-
sion of undocumented aliens. Brennan's third draft then eliminates 
the general discussion of education as a fundamental right. Claim-
ing that he had incorporated Powell's analysis, Brennan concluded 
136. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice Harry A. Blackmun 1 (Mar. 12, 
1982), in Brennan Papers, supra note 52. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. at 2. 
140. Id. 
141. Justice William J. Brennan, Draft Opinion (Plyler v. Doe) (Apr. 5, 1982), in Brennan 
Papers, supra note 52. 
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that he "no longer required any lengthy discussion of legislative ma-
terial or any complex analytic framework."142 But, in response to 
an argument he found implicit in the proposed dissents, Brennan at 
last added a discussion of preemption. He told Powell that such a 
discussion was appropriate because the dissenters apparently be-
lieved that "undocumented status, without more, carried with it a 
State prerogative to deny these children an education," a belief that 
"rests, at heart, on the implications of federal law."143 
Powell immediately responded to Brennan's new draft, thanking 
Brennan "for making this substantial effort to accommodate [his] 
thinking."144 He "suggested minor language changes" to "reflect 
[his] strongly held conviction that an adult illegal alien is here in 
willful violation of our laws."145 Although he "share[d] - and ap-
plaud[ed] - [Brennan's] sympathy for peoples all over the world 
who would like nothing better than to live in our country," hear-
gued that this "understandable desire is no justification for violating 
our laws."146 Powell added parenthetically: "I wish a good many of 
our own citizens, who seem to make a career out of criticizing the 
United States, were more appreciative of the privilege of living in 
this wondrous land of freedom and comparative plenty."147 
After receiving Powell's letter and making the cJ,tanges he sug-
gested, Brennan circulated the opinion to the Court. As one of 
Marshall's clerks noted, "[t]he 'scuttlebutt' is that [Powell] has 
agreed to join this draft,"148 which Powell immediately did.149 Pow-
ell then revised his separate opinion, converting it from a concur-
rence in the result to a simple concurrence and eliminating the now-
unnecessary criticism of treating illegal aliens as a suspect 
classification.150 
The Court handed down its opinion on June 15, 1982. The next 
day Powell sent Brennan a handwritten note congratulating him for 
142. Letter from Justice William J. Brennan to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (Apr. 5, 1982), 
in Brennan Papers, supra note 52. 
143. Id. 
144. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice William J. Brennan (Apr. 7, 1982), 
in Brennan Papers, supra note 52. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. That comment suggests one of the difficulties Brennan faced: that Powell was 
firmly committed to his position for "reasons" that may well have been other than rational, 
which made accommodating them in any way other than complete acquiescence almost 
impossible. 
148. Note on Second Printed Draft Opinion {Plyler v. Doe) {Apr. 7, 1982), in Marshall 
Papers, box 295, file 2. 
149. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice William J. Brennan {Apr. 8, 1982), 
in Brennan Papers, supra note 52 (consisting only of the words "[p]lease join me"). 
150. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Draft Opinion {Plyler v. Doe) (June 7, 1982), in Brennan 
Papers, supra note 52. 
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the opinion, "especially on the painstaking and generous way you 
wrote an opinion that accommodated our several differing views, 
and finally obtained a Court."151 The final opinion, Powell said, 
"will be in every text and case book on Constitutional law."152 
Two aspects of the deliberations in Plyler are noteworthy. First, 
of course, Powell did not really negotiate. He held his position and 
watched Brennan move toward it.153 Second, the opinion drafting 
process had several stages. At the outset Brennan articulated a 
two-pronged theory to justify invalidating a statute that he and 
Powell firmly believed was a seriously misguided public policy. 
Powell insisted that Brennan first dilute one prong and then the 
other .. What resulted was an opinion that on one level had almost 
no generative or doctrinal significance because it invoked too many 
considerations. On another level, the opinion had profound doctri-
nal significance because one could interpret it to hold that the 
Supreme Court will strike down statutes that are unconstitutional 
when a majority of the Court thinks those statutes are unwise social 
policy. Powell's jurisprudence produced an opinion that was almost 
nothing more than a direct reflection of his views of social policy. 
The Framers designed the Constitution, it appears, to allow judges 
to strike down statutes that are, to as reasonable a person as Powell, 
not sensible. 
IV. THE LIMITS OF POWELL'S SOCIAL VISION 
Moderation and balance characterized Powell's understanding 
of his centrist jurisprudence. Those terms, however, do not define 
themselves. In Plyler, the moderate position came down to treating 
a misguided social policy as unconstitutional. Powell did have doc-
trinal concerns, of course, but they were negative: he wanted to 
ensure that the Court's decision did not express a doctrine that 
might have troublesome implications for other cases. Powell's bal-
151. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice William J. Brennan (June 16, 
1982), in Brennan Papers, box 590, file 3. 
152. Id. 
153. Brennan had a similar experience with Justice Powell once before. In Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), Brennan could not persuade Powell to join an opinion char-
acterizing gender as a suspect classification. Instead of recasting it, Brennan let the opinion 
go as a plurality opinion. See pp. 508-10. The contrast between the experience in Plyler and 
Frontiero is intriguing. One possible explanation for the differences is that the Court decided 
Frontiero in 1973. The Warren Court era had ended, but in 1973 the Court did not fully 
realize the import of that fact - it was, after all, the Term of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
{1973). The possibility of planting seeds for later, liberal development remained open, or so 
Brennan might have thought The Court decided Plyler almost a decade later. Liberal victo-
ries were by then few and far between. A transformed federal judiciary was in the making, 
and there was little reason to think that the new judges would develop statements in plurality 
opinions in a liberal direction. Brennan might have thought it would be better to get an 
authoritative precedent in Plyler, no matter how narrow, than to hope for an opinion that 
would encourage further liberal development 
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ancing was his bulwark against a rule-based formalism, but it did 
little to explain why the statute in Plyler was bad social policy, let 
alone unconstitutional. In Murgia, the moderate position was sim-
ply being reasonable about things. Not infrequently, Powell's centr-
ism amounted to taking the Constitution to mean what any person 
as reasonable as Powell thought it to mean. Jeffries's description of 
the course of Powell's thought about affirmative action provides an 
example (pp. 469-78). As the cases came to the Court, he began to 
understand the varying circumstances in which affirmative action 
programs were adopted. Powell's "policy" was "to allow some af-
firmative action, but not too much; to permit race-consciousness, 
but only where necessary" (p. 500). 
In the employment context, Powell concentrated on the impact 
of affirmative action programs on those he called "innocent em-
ployees,"154 and he was less sensitive to the impact on those Justice 
Brennan called "equally innocent victims of racial discrimina-
tion."155 For Powell, affirmative action programs affecting hiring 
were easier to support than those affecting promotions, and those 
affecting layoffs were the most questionable. 
Although Powell often stated that affirmative action programs 
had to satisfy the highest standard of review,156 his views of the 
equities of the varying situations meant that he applied that stan-
dard in a manner more consistent with the flexibility he and Bren-
nan had sought in Murgia than with the rigidity ordinarily 
associated with strict scrutiny. The result, as one of Marshall's law 
clerks put it, was that "it [was] hard to tell whether ... [lower courts 
had] 'misread' [a Powell opinion], since nobody knows what that 
opinion stands for now that Justice Powell has retired."157 Powell's 
desire to achieve balance meant that the law he articulated re-
flected the balance he struck, not a balance accessible to any fair 
reader of the cases. 
Powell's most important discussion of affirmative action came in 
Regents of the University of Califomia·v. Bakke,158 in which the fact 
that he spoke only for himself is symptomatic of what it meant to be 
a centrist. He was, in his words, "a [']chief['] with no [']indians[']" 
154. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 788-89 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
155. Mark V. Tushnet, The Supreme Court and Race Discrimination, 1967-1991: The 
View from the Marshall Papers, 36 WM. & MARYL. REv. 473, 539 n.399 (1995) (quoting 
Memorandum from Justice William J. Brennan to Conference 3 (Jan. 29, 1976), in Marshall 
Papers, box 162, file 5). 
156. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986). 
157. Tushnet, supra note 155, at 540 (quoting Carol Steiker, Bench Memo (City of Rich-
mond v. J.A. Croson Co.), in Marshall Papers, box 429, file 4). 
158. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
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when he announced the Court's judgment.159 Powell quickly con-
cluded that the strictly numerical program adopted by the Univer-
sity of, California at Davis's medical school violated the 
Constitution, but he wanted to preserve some flexibility for affirma-
tive action programs that "[took] race into account."160 Early in the 
Court's deliberations, Justice White made the cogent and unan-
swerable point that race-sensitive programs were indistinguishable 
in principle from the Davis program: on the margin - that is, as 
between two otherwise equal· candidates for; admission - a race-
sensitive. program operated to prefer the African-American candi-
date over the white candidate just as rigidly as Davis's did.161 For 
Powell, however, race-sensitive programs were more moderate than 
Davis's in Bakke, and, apparently for that reason alone, the Court 
should consider race-sensitive programs constitutio~al (pp. 484-85). 
Jeffries is appropriately critical of Powell's stance in the Bakke 
case (pp. 469-73, 484). Powell approved the affirmative action pro-
gram at Harvard College, which "merely" treated race as a "plus 
factor" in admissions, but he disapproved of the apparently more 
rigid plan challenged in Bakke. Jeffries understands that the 
Harvard program was a more genteel way of accomplishing the 
same results as the plan in Bakke, and that on the margins a plus 
factor has precisely the same effect as that plan; Powell's position 
was, as Jeffries says, "pure sophistry."162 
The very gentility of the Harvard program, though, is what may 
have mattered to Powell. Reviewing Powell's career as a whole, 
one can see a pattern in which Powell could appreciate claims made 
by those with whom he could readily identify, but he could not fully 
appreciate claims made by those who seemed c:lifferent from him. 
Powell's actions during the process of desegregation in Virginia 
illustrate the pattern. Powell was chair of the Richmond school 
board in the years following Brown v. Board of Education163 and 
was an important behind-the-scenes figure in the state's political 
life. Virginia was the home of "massive resistance"164 fo desegrega-
tion, and Powell did nothing in public and little in private to oppose 
such resistance. Jeffries concludes that Powell "never really identi-
fied himself with the needs and aspirations of Virginia's black 
school-children" (p.172). More broadly, Powell's views on desegre-
159. P. 494 {alteration in original); cf. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, BEHIND BAKKE: AFFIRMA-
TIVE AcnoN AND nm SUPREME CoURT 141 (1988). 
160. SCHWARTZ, supra note 159, at 96-97. 
161. Tushnet, supra note 155, at 518-19. 
162. P. 484. For a more extended discussion, see Tushnet, supra note 155. 
163. 347 U.S. 483 {1954). 
164. MARK v. TUSHNET, MAKING Cxvn. RIGHTS LAw: THURGOOD MARsHALL AND TiiE 
SUPREME CoURT, 1936-1961, at 247-48 (1994). 
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gation were shaped by a social vision in which "the neighborhood 
school" took on an almost iconic significance, whether or not it ac-
complished much of value, and whether or not it interfered with the 
alternative social vision of integration's proponents. 
Virginia's massive resistance to desegregation had two aspects. 
One was a :flashy but legally meaningless public relations campaign 
developed by James Jackson Kilpatrick, editor of the Richmond 
News-Leader. Kilpatrick revived the constitutional theory of inter-
position, according to which state governments could interpose 
themselves between the national government and the state's citi-
zens when the national government acted unconstitutionally.165 
James Madison and Thomas Jefferson had been associated with a 
version of interposition during the controversy over the Federal 
Alien and Sedition Acts at the end of the eighteenth century. Their 
version, though, was more complicated than Kilpatrick's, who drew 
his arguments primarily from John C. Calhoun. In the nullification 
crisis of 1832-33, Madison, at least, expressly rejected Calhoun's 
version.166 
By the 1950s, the theory of interposition lacked any serious con-
stitutional support. Powell found it completely ridiculous. He 
wrote letters ~o Yirginia's governor decrying the theory (pp. 146-
49), and he engaged in a debate with Kilpatrick at a prestigious 
Richmond private club (pp. 145-46). He even drafted a thirty-page 
article challenging the theory as "a doctrine of chaos - not of law" 
(p. 149). Notably, however, he withdrew the article from submis-
sion (pp. 149-50). 
In private, then, Powell attacked the most extreme aspect of 
massive resistance. In public, however, he did nothing. Jeffries 
writes that "there was nothing Powell could have done" to thwart 
massive resistance in 1956 (p. 150), but perhaps an important figure 
like Powell could have reduced some of the political force behind 
massive resistance if he had come out against interposition. To do 
so, however, Powell would have had to engage in political discus-
sions with people rather unlike himself. It was one thing to debate 
James Jackson Kilpatrick at a Richmond private club; it would have 
been quite another for Powell to take on the racist politicians -
and, even worse, their supporters - who sincerely believed in 
interposition.167 
165. Id. at 240-41. 
166. For Jeffries's discussion of the theory, see pp. 137-39. 
167. I say "sincerely believed" to exempt the leaders of Senator Harry Byrd's political 
machine, who supported massive resistance because it was politically expedient. JAMES W. 
ELY, JR., THE CRis1s OF CoNSERVATIVE VIRGINIA: THE BYRD ORGANIZATION AND nra 
Poum:s OF MAssIVE REsISTANCE (1976). 
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Massive resistance had another aspect. Virginia's legislature en-
acted statutes making it exceedingly difficult for local school dis-
tricts to take even the most modest- or, as it was later put, token 
- steps toward eliminating segregated schools. The state took the 
power of assigning students to particular schools away from local 
boards and placed immense procedural obstacles in the way of any 
individual student who sought to challenge his or her school assign-
ment. The ultimate threat was to force schools to close rather than 
desegregate. 
Here Jeffries's argument that Powell could do little to thwart 
massive resistance has more force. As a member of the Richmond 
school board, Powell might have done something to begin the de-
segregation process there (p. 141). But the massive resistance stat-
utes resulted from a large-scale political mobilization, in which 
legislators from outside Richmond had the largest role. By the time 
local districts were willing to begin desegregation, as in the state's 
northern suburbs of Washington, D.C., and in Charlottesville, or by 
the time the federal courts forced other districts to do so, Powell 
was a member of the state board of education. There his power to 
influence desegregation in any particular district was quite small. 
As Jeffries puts it, on the state board Powell was "willing to accept 
desegregation but was also supremely tolerant of the status quo" (p. 
170). 
Jeffries shows that Powell's actions in Virginia during the deseg-
regation process were prudent and cautious. Powell was "disen-
gaged" (p. 177) and "never took a leading role" on the issue of 
desegregation (p. 172). These were, in.· Jeffries's terms, "sin[s] of 
omission" (p. 172), which seems a fair assessment.168 Powell's sins 
resulted from a temperament that sought balance and tried to hold 
the extremes - those promoting massive resistance and those 
seeking integration - at equal distance. It is not that Powell ac-
tively opposed desegregation, or that he disregarded the "aspira-
tions" (p. 172) of Virginia's African Americans; it is just that he 
could not quite give them the same weight he gave to the aspira-
tions of those seeking to preserve neighborhood schools. When 
one seeks to balance interests, the result is likely to be distorted to 
the extent that one systematically undervalues the interests on one 
168. Jeffries does discuss one "sin of commission," Powell's agreement with the state 
school board's decision to waive a procedural requirement so that the Prince Edward County 
School Board could reimburse parents for a portion of their expenses in sending their chil-
dren to segregation academies while the county's schools were closed in the state's most 
dramatic expression of massive resistance. Pp. 175-77. As Jeffries shows, though, the state 
board's action in waiving the procedural requirement was routine. For Jeffries, Powell's vote 
is "a particularly striking example of Powell's general disengagement from the problems of 
desegregation." P. 177. 
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side of the balance while giving full weight to the interests on the 
other side. 
Powell's limited social vision may account for his decisions in 
abortion cases. Jeffries closes his discussion of the abortion cases 
with an anecdote explaining that Powell understood the impact of 
restrictive abortion laws because a messenger in his law firm had 
helped someone obtain an illegal abortion that ended in the 
woman's death (p. 347). Jeffries also stresses that Powell's conver-
sations with one of his daughters "reinforced" his views (p. 347). It 
is not hard to interpret Powell's votes in abortion cases as reflecting 
the limits of his social vision. To the extent that restrictive abortion 
laws adversely affected people like him and his family, he found 
them unconstitutional; to the extent that they adversely affected 
women who were not part of his social vision - the poor - he 
found them constitutional.169 
Similarly, Powell's now-famous comments during the delibera-
tions over Bowers v. Hardwick110 are consistent with the view that 
his social vision was limited. Powell believed that he had never 
known a homosexual, and he said so to his gay law clerk (p. 521); 
Justice Harry Blackmun perhaps unfortunately resisted the urge to 
correct Powell's misunderstanding (p. 528). Not knowing who he 
knew, Powell voted to uphold Georgia's statute making sodomy a 
criminal offense. · 
Such limits emerge even in passing comments. Rhodes v. Chap-
man111 involved a challenge to overcrowded conditions at an Ohio 
prison. The Court, in an opinion by Powell, rejected the challenge. 
At one point, Powell inserted a sentence purporting to support the 
Court's conclusion: "Many persons not confined in prisons, and not 
always compelled by poverty, would welcome comparable sleeping 
quarters" to those in the Ohio prison.172 Justice Marshall replied: 
I know of no one who would voluntarily spend most of his time with 
only 30 square feet to call his own, unless compelled by poverty or by 
the State. It is perhaps unnecessary to add that no one would contend 
that the conditions in which the poor are forced to live represent our 
nation's standards of decency.113 
169. Compare City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 {1983) (in-
validating a twenty-four hour waiting period and other restrictions on the availability of abor-
tions) with Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 {1980) (upholding a federal statute denying 
reimbursement through the Medicaid system for abortions). 
170. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
171. 452 U.S. 337 {1981). 
172. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Draft Opinion (Rhodes v. Chapman) {May 4, 1981), in 
Marshall Papers, box 277, file 3, at 10. 
173. Justice Thurgood Marshall, Draft Opinion (Rhodes v. Chapman) (May 15, 1981), in 
Marshall Papers, box 227, file 3, at 8 n.8. 
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Powell tinkered with the sentence, and in the end he omitted it 
from the published opinion. That he thought to write it in the first 
place and that he persisted with it even after Marshall's initial com-
ment, shows the limits of Powell's social vision. 
There is an underside .to balance and centrism that Powell's 
work on the Court also illustrates. Both principles can degenerate 
into an effort to have things two ways. Too often on crucial matters 
Powell tried to do this. 
Powell's repudiation of his vote in Bowers is well-known. Soon 
after his retirement, Powell said that, on reflection, he believed that 
he had erred in casting the fifth vote to uphold Georgia's an-
tisodomy statute (p. 530). Jeffries describes Powell's "waffl[ing]" on 
the question of gay rights and his effort, feebly expressed in his con-
curring opinion in Bowers, to develop a compromise position that 
would allow states to criminalize homosexual sodomy but not to 
impose substantial criminal sentences for engaging in homosexual 
activities (pp. 514-19). 
Jeffries explains Powell's vote in Bowers by referring to Powell's 
age - which in this context must mean his politically conservative 
instincts - and the weakness of the Eighth Amendment theory he 
developed to claim the cent'er against the advocates of gay rights on 
the left and the bigotry of Chief Justice Warren Burger's position 
on the right (pp. 520-24). But, as Jeffries acknowledges, in Bowers 
Powell "failed to act on his own best judgment" (p. 527). 
Powell's change of heart on Bowers was k,nown before ieffries's 
book. Jeffries reveals that Powell haq second thoughts about the 
death penalty as well. In an interview with Jeffries, Powell stated 
that he now believed that the Court wrongly decided McCleskey v. 
Kemp114 - not because he was wrong in rejecting McCleskey's evi-
dence of racial discrimination in the administration of capital pun-
ishment, but because he could not justify capital punishment itself 
(pp. 451-52). While on the Court, Powell characteristically had at-
tempted to define a middle ground for death penalty jurisprudence. 
Trying to work within a jurisprudence that was concerned with 
avoiding the arbitrary imposition of death sentences, Powell agreed 
that it was unconstitutional to require a capital sentence in any class 
of cases - even though mandatory penalties would eliminate dis-
cretion at the sentencing stage175 - and that courts should allow 
defendants facing the prospect of a death sentence to introduce any 
mitigating evidence they had even though it reintroduced the possi-
bility of arbitrary jury sympathy.116 
174. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
175. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
176. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-08 (1978). 
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The difficulties of sustaining a centrist position on the death 
penalty are perhaps best illustrated by the short-lived rule first ar-
ticulated in a Powell opinion that juries could not hear evidence 
about the impact of a murder on the victim's family and friends, 
because, as Powell wrote, that would encourage juries to show 
mercy to killers whose victims were especially unsympathetfo.111 
Powell appears not to have understood that victim-impact evidence 
was hardly necessary for that to happen or not to have seen the 
connection between the concern he expressed in the victim-impact 
case and McCleskey v. Kemp. In Mccleskey, he could have inter-
preted the statistical evidence to establish that juries were more 
likely to impose the death penalty in cases in which the victim was, 
as they saw it, "sympathetic," that is, white, than in cases in which 
the victim was "unsympathetic," that is, African-American. 
Powell eventually got impatient with the difficulty in actually 
carrying out executions. Death penalty cases were a form of legal 
guerrilla warfare that cast the legal process in a bad light. He 
thought that lawyers for those under sentence of death had figured 
out how to "manipulate[]" the Court's rules, and urged his col-
leagues to consider changing those rules.178 For a while Powell 
hoped that the Court and Congress might defeat the death-penalty 
guerrillas by speeding up the legal process and by closing off oppor-
tunities to raise new issues. But, according to Jeffries, the "bitter 
education of the cases" and Powell's own declining regard for judi-
cial restraint led Powell to the judgment that the middle ground he 
regularly sought was simply untenable on the death penalty (pp. 
452-53). In a memorandum to his colleagues in 1985, Powell sug-
gested that "unless the habeas corpus statute is substantially 
changed . . . the states should rescind their capital punishment 
laws."179 He had "no doubt as to the constitutionality of capital 
punishment," he wrote, "but I have grave doubts as to whether it 
now serves the purposes of deterrence and retribution. "18° 
On Bowers and capital punishment, Powell openly expressed his 
change in views. His record on his actions during the process of 
desegregation in ~chmond is more troubling. During his confirma-
tion hearings, Powell presented himself as firmly committed to the 
principles of Brown and as having acted in Richmond to implement 
177. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 
808 (1991). 
178. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Colleagues 2 (Sept. 4, 1985), in Brennan 
Papers, box 700, file 7 (discussing Darden v. Wainwright); see also Memorandum from Justice 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to the Conference 1 (Mar. 6, 1986), in Brennan Papers, box 719, file 16 
(referring to "a gross abuse of the processes of our Court by counsel for Adams"). 
179. Letter from Justice Powell to Colleagues, supra note 178, at 2. 
180. Id. 
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Brown (pp. 234-36). As Jeffries shows, that was an exercise in self-
revisionism (pp. 297-98). 
Commenting on Powell's retrospective self-justifications, Jeffries 
notes Powell's "uneasiness about personal responsibility" and his 
"attempt to distance himself from the consequences of his own 
acts" (p. 429). Charitably put, the contrast between Powell's ac-
tions in Bowers, in the death penalty cases, and during the desegre-
gation process in Richmond on the one hand, and his later 
understanding of what the right thing to have done was on the 
other, shows a failure of Powell's moral imagination. 
It also shows Powell's concern that those whose judgments he 
valued regard his actions well. When he actually had authority to 
make decisions - as an important figure in Richmond's public life 
and as a Justice - he could reasonably expect that the social 
groups with which he was affiliated would see his decisions as sensi-
ble. Afterwards, though, he had to worry about the verdict of his-
tory. By repudiating actions that either had not stood the test of 
time, for example his behavior in Richmond, or that might not do 
so, for example his votes in Bowers and death penalty cases, Powell 
could at least hope that historians would see him in a better light 
than they would if all they had to go on was what he had actually 
done.1s1 
I find myself quite ambivalent about Powell's career. If asked to 
assess Powell's performance, I am inclined tp focus on what he did 
when he had power, not on what he later said he· should have done. 
James Russell Lowell's verse comes to mind: "Once to every man 
and nation comes the moment to decide, in the strife of Truth with 
Falsehood, for the good or evil side[.]"182 Powell had more than 
one moment to decide, and on balance he did not choose the good 
side. 
That conclusion, however, seems unduly harsh. We could not 
reasonably expect that a person with Powell's affiliations would 
have acted much differently. His social vision was limited, but one 
part of it surely was a concern for historical reputation. His retro-
spective reconstructions of his views are therefore quite under-
standable. Although one might want a bit more self-awareness and 
even embarrassment on Powell's part about the distance between 
what he did and what he said he should have done, even that is 
probably too much to ask of a person like him. Jeffries describes 
Powell as a man of "ambition and reserve" (p. 220). His ambition 
181. At least with respect to Bowers, Powell's "recantation" indeed seems to have im-
proved his reputation. See, e.g., p. 530 (quoting Laurence Tribe as admiring Powell's willing-
ness to admit error). 
182. James Russell Lowell, The Present Crisis, in 7 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES RUSSELL 
LoWELL 178, 180 (Boston, Houghton, Mifflin 1891). 
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led him to act as he did when he had power and afterward; his re-
serve made it impossible for him to understand his actions. 
V. SOCIAL VISION AND THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CENTRISM 
Powell's jurisprudence of centrism suggests some broader con-
clusions. Perhaps balancing competing interests is a suitable way 
for people with a capacious social vision to decide cases. They can 
appreciate the, rel~vant consiperations no matter what case people 
present to them: In desegregation cases they would appreciate the 
aspirations of those seeking high-quality integrated schools and of 
those seeking to preserve a social order with which they were com-
fortable; in affirmative action cases they would appreciate the con-
cerns of innocent white victims of affirmative action programs and 
of innocent African American victims of a historically embedded 
system of race discrimination; in a capital punishment case they 
would appreciate the conditions that led a murderer into the situa-
tion in which killing seemed the right thing to do and the devasta-
tion that criminal conduct wreaks on our society. Furthermore, 
they would appreciate the value of developing a legal rule with suf-
ficient generality to guide officials and citizens. 
It would be senseless to believe that only those who come from 
disadvantaged backgrounds can possibly have an appropriately ca-
pacious social vision to engage in the balancing of interests. After 
all, everyone's social vision is limited, and we are all to some extent 
the captives of our backgrounds. Powell's social vision was not as 
narrow as it could have been: His empathy for the children of un-
documented aliens in Plyler, his endorsement of the basic right of 
women to choose in abortion cases, his acceptance of some degree 
of affirmative action, and his opposition to victim-impact state-
ments all show that he did appreciate the impact of law on people 
with whom he had little contact. Powell's dedication to programs 
designed to secure adequate legal services for the poor (pp. 197-
201), which led Jean Camper Cahn to stress his capacity for empa-
thy in a letter supporting his nomination to the Court (p. 236), fur-
ther illustrates Powell's ability to transcend his background in some 
ways. But another part of Powell's difficulty with Bowers seems 
symptomatic of the deeper limitations on Powell's vision. Not only 
did Powell not know that he had worked with gays; according to 
Jeffries's account of a conversation Powell had, Powell simply could 
not comprehend either the emotional or the physical dimensions of 
sexual attraction between men (p. 521). 
Here Powell's experience as a lawyer is suggestive. Biographies 
of lawyers-turned-judges regularly confront a problem in describing 
their subjects' lives as lawyers: Neither the subjects nor their law 
firms can release information on the lawyer's legal practice without 
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the permission of clients and their successors. When, as with Pow-
ell, the clients are large corporations, it is basically impossible to 
obtain detailed information about the lawyer's legal practice -
what he did between the time he arrived in the office each morning 
and the time he left late in the evening.183 
Jeffries's description of Powell's career before his appointment 
to the Court, however, contains some hints about Powell's legal 
practice. At least from the time Powell was a successful corporate 
lawyer, his priva,te practice of law may well .have consisted of his 
public career in the Richmond, state, and national bar associations; 
service on the Richmond and state boards of education; service on 
other public commissions; and service on corporate boards of direc-
tors. Being a successful corporate lawyer; that is, appears to consist 
of rounds of meetings, some of which are designed to attract clients, 
others of which consist of holding the hands of existing clients.184 
Jeffries emphasizes how lonely Powell felt life at the Court to be, 
precisely because there were no meetings (p. 335). At one point in 
his career, Powell had been a successful civil trial lawyer, but by the 
time he went on the Court, the actual lawyering he did appears to 
have consisted of reviewing the work of his subordinates, dicta-
phone in hand, commenting on what they had produced and sug-
gesting revisions or additions.1ss 
Powell's legal pq1.ctice, then, did not expose· him to the wide 
range of human experiences that might have expanded his social 
vision. As a lawyer, Powell "worked chiefly with people" (p. 335), 
but the people he worked with were dtawn from a relatively narrow 
range. His public service also might have exposed him to a wider 
range of people, but in fact it did.not. During the 1950s and 1960s, 
a lawyer who was successful in the internal politics of bar associa-
tions had to have certain political skills, but he did not need to 
reach out to widely diverse .constituencies for support. 
Powell might have transcended the limitations of his back-
ground by engaging in the rough-and-tumble of public politics. To 
do so, however, he would have had to be quite a different person. 
In making this suggestion, I am not arguing we ought to draw our 
183. Jeffries provides a few anecdotes about Powell's legal work. One culminates in a 
visit by Powell to an alumnus of his own college, who expedited the approval of a securities 
registration Powell was seeking - an example of lawyering as the use of "[t]he old-boy 
network." P. 52. 
184. Powell's experience as a lawyer made him comfortable with the business and com-
mercial cases on the Court's docket Understandably, Jeffries devotes no attention to those 
cases. 
·. 185. Jeffries describes Powell's style of working on opinions in a similar manner. P. 295; 
see also p. 478. 
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Justices solely from the ranks of experienced politicians.1s6 My sug-
gestion is more limited and conditional: If a judge adheres to a 
jurisprudence of balancing, as Powell did, it would be desirable for 
that judge to have a capacious social vision. Judges who lack such a 
vision may not do a good job in balancing competing interests be-
cause they do not fully appreciate the range of interests at stake. 
Perhaps a judge like Powell would have done better as a 
formalist.187 
186. I have made something like that suggestion before, see Mark Tushnet, Constitutional 
Interpretation, Character, and Experience, 72 B.U. L. REv. 747 (1992}, but I now believe that 
my argument was too broad. 
187. I am indebted to my students in constitutional law during the fall quarter of 1994 for 
helping me see this point 
